Zdzislaw
STAHL (1891-1987)
Political journalist,
economist, politician. B. Feb. 10, 1901, Lvov, in the family associated
with the leaders of the National League (Liga Narodowa) and the
National-Democratic Party (Stronnictwo Narodowo-Demokratyczne).
1930-35 deputy to the Sejm sponsored by the National Party (Stronnictwo
Narodowe, SN). A critic of liberalism, he fervently supported the
April Constitution with its model of a strong nation-state. In 1938
he was elected to the Sejm as a deputy sponsored by the Camp of
National Unity (Obóz Zjednoczenia Narodowego) and wrote propaganda
texts for this organization. 1934-37 editor of Dziennik Lwowski, 1937-39 deputy editor-in-chief of the governmental
Gazeta Polska. In Sep.
1939 he was arrested by NKVD and sent to a Soviet gulag. From 1941
in the army of W. Anders in USSR. He frequently wrote about the
Katyñ murders, criticizing the fact that the Western Allies
kept silent on that subject. When the war ended, he remained in
Great Britain, where he lectured in economy and law at the London-based
Polish University-In-Exile. He belonged to the most eminent émigré
political commentators, he wrote for Orze³
Bia³y and Polish
Affairs, and published separate pamphlets. He focused on the
problems of Soviet communism, the ways of combating and resisting
it; he was opposed to all compromises with communism. He published
scholarly works from the field of fiscal policy and law. His works
include: Listy polityczne
("Political Letters", 1935), Idea
i walka ("Idea and Struggle", 1938), Polityka
polska po œmierci Pi³sudskiego ("Polish Politics After
Pi³sudski's Death", c. 1936), Marksizm-leninizm
i realizm a idea niepodleg³oœci ("Marxist-Leninism
and Realism Versus the Idea of Independence", 1973), and Zbrodnia
katyñska w œwietle dokumentów ("The Katyñ
Massacre in the Light of Documents", 1948, with other authors).
D. Nov 13, 1987, London.
The selected fragments
are from Marksizm-leninizm
i realizm a idea niepodleg³oœci. Wyk³ad na inauguracji roku akademickiego
Polskiego Uniwersytetu na ObczyŸnie w dniu 25 listopada 1972
("Marxism-Leninism...
An inauguration
lecture presented on Nov. 25, 1972, at the Polish University-In-Exile"):
London 1973, pp. 11-15 and 17-20.
From the viewpoint of the communist ideology, which gives priority to economic
interests, it is not the nation
- an association based on a spiritual bond, to which material differences
are subordinated and resolved in the spirit of the sovereign national
community - but the class
which constitutes the vital historical association, and class struggle
provides the content of this history. Within this framework independent
states are merely "superstructures" of the fundamental international
class struggle, to which everything else should be subservient,
and these "nation-state superstructures" should vanish in the course
of further development. Therefore, according to the same Marxist-Leninist
theory, the fundamental power of the essential and highest association,
i.e. the class, is not the state but the party, as the leading representative
of the working class. The headquarters of this international party
are located in Moscow and constitute, especially in relation to
the imposed satellite regimes, their real government.
This essential commitment to the future dismantling of the "nation-state
superstructure", inherent in the Soviet doctrine, is not openly
and undisguisedly communicated to the conquered nations. When, after
the revolution, Lenin, and Stalin developed a doctrine supplanting
the former Tsarist centralism with a new Bolshevik one, they worked
out a formula that provided such a disguise. It is expressed in
the principle that "culture should be national in form and socialist, that is, communist,
in content". In the name of this utterly disingenuous principle,
a total centrally governed Soviet tyranny was constructed, and formally
it is not only a state founded on elections, but also a parliamentary
democracy and an allegedly voluntary union of more than a dozen
national republics. These republics even have the supposed right
to secede from the Moscow headquarters and enter the path of complete
independence.
When we consider the post-war policy of Moscow towards the European nations
on which it imposed satellite regimes, formally recognizing their
independence and ruling them politically through a party organization,
we must not forget the above-quoted Leninist-Stalinist formula of
the nations policy. It is a version and, as conceived by the Soviet
communists, an introductory stage of enacting the very commitment
which motivated the creators of the Union of Soviet Republics, a
commitment through which they subjected to Moscow the same nations
for whose independence they were calling and supposedly fighting
prior to taking power.
The formula of a culture national
in form and socialist, that is, communist, in content, the political
aspect and expression of which is national independence as regards
form, and communist, i.e. Soviet, independence, - directed by the
party headquarters in the Kremlin - as regards content, plays an
important tactical role and is crucial as a carefully thought-out
method of social engineering, employed in relation to the conquered
nations. It makes it possible to achieve the desired results in
a piecemeal and indirect fashion, in those places where direct and
open action encounters too much resistance. Such indirect methods
are employed by Soviet psychological engineering especially towards
two categories of what Marxism-Leninism treats as a "superstructure"
of socio-economic class conditions: towards religion and national
awareness. As regards the Polish nation, Moscow understands that
it presents the greatest difficulties, on account of the established
Catholicism of our nation and a strong national character, combined
with a deeply entrenched, centuries-long aversion to Russia.
The Indirect
Effects of the Ideological Lie
It would be a mistake, however, to downplay various indirect effects of
the carefully thought-out communist methods, which open the way
for the voluntary acceptance of what is rejected by Polish society
when it appears without the pseudo-national and ideological mask.
I mean here the psychological effects of the fact that the People's
Republic of Poland, although actually ruled by the party in Moscow,
is formally independent. During the period of the partitions, whoever
was in favor of independence had to be opposed the partitions; the
matter was clear and unambiguous. The Polish people were not asked
to regard the anniversary of the partitions as a national holiday,
and the monuments of rulers symbolizing the partitions were generally
held in contempt. Today the 22nd of July, the anniversary
of the creation of the satellite regime imposed on Poland by communist
Moscow, is establishing itself as a Polish national holiday, and
the younger generations are often unaware of the actual facts and
historical deeds, worthy of national recognition. True, the healthy
instincts of Polish patriotism are not directly violated, but they
are perfidiously channeled towards false outlets, and I think no
effective reaction has been elaborated yet.
In this circular and perfidious way the idea of Polish independence, though
not attacked outright, is misrepresented in its content, or at least
divested of its positive content. This false idea of independence
and the fiction of an independent government also provide a moral
excuse for the weaker social elements which surrender to it, although
they would be incapable of overtly renouncing the idea of independence,
that is, of its open betrayal. Thus the appearances, mainly of religious
tolerance and of independent statehood, create a kind of psychological
stepping-stone towards accepting the enforced reality of a system
arising from Marxism-Leninism. It is a stepping-stone towards accepting
a system whose materialist, atheist ideology is committed to dismantling
historical national awarenesses and replacing them with an international
and class awareness of the so-called proletarian internationalism,
that is, a formation fundamentally, essentially at odds with Polishness.
It is expected that this process will be aided by the passage of
time and the effects of the new conditions of the communistic socio-economic
system, a system which, as the materialist doctrine predicts, should
completely transform the Polish national character.
Realism
as an Ally of Sovietization
In so-called political realism [...] Marxism-Leninism finds an ally both
in the field of practical psychology and on the level of materialist
philosophy. I added the qualification "so-called" because the matter
involves a concept of realism with which I disagree - a disagreement
which I will explain later - and the qualification "political" because
the term realism has different meanings in various fields of philosophy,
metaphysics or epistemology, unconnected with politics.
Now political realism, as it is generally, but in my opinion wrongly understood,
denotes an attitude of adapting to reality, regardless of the origins
and content of this reality; it also implies that politics is an
art of adapting. Such an attitude, although not contained in the
Marxist-Leninist doctrine, suits its practical purposes when it
is taken up by the group of nations subjected to the communist regime.
For such a "realism" provides a theoretically passable justification
for the acceptance of communism and for reconciling oneself with
all the constitutional and ideological changes which communism has
imposed on the conquered nations, including ours. Since "realism"
teaches that one must adapt to every reality, even to an enforced
one, it becomes an ally of Marxism-Leninism and the vanguard opening
the way to its willing acceptance.
Such a conception of "political realism" also stems from the materialist
theory which claims that external conditions are a determining factor
of human awareness. Materialism says that these external conditions
- man's physical environment - create a consciousness of man's being
only a function and consequence of these material surroundings.
Byt opredlayet soznanie
- this is how Lenin formulated the view that the human spirit can
be molded by means of external material conditions, or, in other
words, that the human spirit can be transformed by the imposition
of a new class-based, communist constitution. The communists themselves
do not intend to adapt to foreign constitutions, as the precepts
of the so-called political realism might ask them to do. They hope
instead for the adaptation of those on whom they imposed their rule
and their system. [...]
Categorizing politics and politicians in terms of the idealism/realism
distinction is superficial, irrelevant, and false; it does not do
justice to our concepts, although some persons of authority support
it. For every policy must be realistic in its appraisal of reality
and in its choice of means, but it must be idealistic in its ends,
directed towards creative change. Józef Pi³sudski is called
an idealist and a representative of Romanticism in politics, and
yet he was capable of finding realistic means to shape the existing
reality, which was opposed to his ends. Hence he was also a great
"executor".
The ends of politics can be proximate or remote, easier or more difficult
to attain. Yet the fact of their being difficult to attain or remote
in time does not deprive politics of realism, if the policy is based
on a realistic appraisal of reality and points to realistic - even
if for the time being only indirect and piecemeal - means, or at
least points in the general direction which the long path must take.
Furthermore, the appraisal of reality by so-called realists, who see only
the surface of the world around them, so often fails! Before 1914
"realists" could not envisage a Europe without the three partitioning
powers and regarded the independence project as an unreal pipe dream.
In fact, neither their supposedly realistic judgement, nor the paths
they suggested to the nation, turned out to be realistic. On the
other hand, those who were able to discern a deeper historical tendency
behind the external facade, and pointed to independence as the goal
for the nation and who knew which means to select - namely armed
struggle and carefully thought-out international diplomacy - are
those who in fact proved to have been realists.